Halachic Policy: Decision Making

A commenter on this blog argued that I speak in terms that are too general, and that I don't sufficiently deal with the problems in praxis. To this charge I plead "Kind of Guilty". While I have tried to bring up issues and make some concrete suggestions for issues (see my posts on sex-ed, for instance), it is true that I did not discuss every single problem that could come up in practice.

There are a number of reasons for this: 1) Blogs are a good medium for bringing general ideas or sources, not for detailed discussion. I doubt many people have the energy to read posts the length of a web page. 2) My ideas are still under-developed (this blog is a medium for sharpening them) 3) I don't pretend to have all the answers for every problem.

The purpose of my posts on this blog were to demonstrate that "it's not so simple" is an argument that cuts both ways. The arguments in favor of kula on issues of contention are serious ones that cannot be airily dismissed any more than arguments lechumra. My point was to attack the very idea of "instinctive" policy, either rightward or leftward. It thus follows that I am four-square against the idea of "blanket" rulings. I consider such attitudes to be an abdication of responsibility, a demonstration of contempt for actually grappling with complicated real-life decisions.

While I hope to discuss more specific issues later on, I thought I might in the meantime tentatively suggest guidelines for proper halachic public policy decision making, regardless of the case or the outcome:

1) Deliberation: A Jewish judge must render decisions beyishuv da'at and after careful consideration. All the more so a Rabbi or communal leader; whose policy decision(s) can affect as many as hundreds of thousands of people. Such acts should never be done by "shooting from the hip" or on impulse, but rather after a thorough examination.

2) Informed Decision: People who render decisions should know all the facts before deciding. These are real cases and real people, not theoretical Talmudic abstractions; they should be treated as situations to be investigated, not abstract problems with nothing but sefekot. Most "What If" questions can easily be solved by making inquiries, quiet or otherwise. For instance, doubts as to whether the women soldiers would dress tznius or whether there would be anti-Rabbinic rhetoric at the Lamed-Heh could have easily be resolved with a few phone calls to the event organizers. The rule is simple: no "shemas" allowed in halachic public policy.

3) All Sides: Decisions should be based on a consideration of all the arguments for and against various courses of action. These considerations should include not only strictly formal halacha, but also the broader considerations that inform halacha (takana she'ein hatzibur yachol la'amod ba, hillul hashem &c).

4) Reasoned Explanations: No more "because I say so" decisions. All decisions should be published, explaining what course of action was taken and why.